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KEYNOTE ADDRESS† 
Conrad P. Voldstad* 
Good morning ladies and gentlemen.  I am delighted to be the 
keynote speaker at this symposium on the regulation of OTC 
derivatives.  As many of you know, I retired as CEO of the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) at the end of 2011.  While 
I remain an advisor to ISDA and its Board, my remarks today will 
strictly be my own.  I take full responsibility for my opinions and hope 
they give one and all pause for thought and discussion as we proceed 
through the symposium. 
While I am a graduate of Fordham Law School, I have never 
practiced law.  My background has been in management, trading and 
underwriting, and analysis.  As you know from the introduction, I was 
the first Global Head of JP Morgan’s Derivatives Group, the head of 
Global Markets at Merrill Lynch, founder of the first AAA-rated swap 
company, one of a team that liquidated Long Term Capital Management 
in 1998 and 1999, and a manager of my own hedge fund for a number of 
years.  I also had a valuable stint on the board of a credit reinsurance 
company.  I should also mention I spent several years at JP Morgan as a 
lending officer to large companies and banks in the United States.  
These were all important experiences. 
Today, I will talk about facts and numbers as well as the common 
sense needs for regulatory reform.  I will suggest that we may be 
heading for some regulatory overkill just as we may be seeing the same 
with respect to bank capital requirements.  I will start my remarks by 
                                                                                                                                         
† This transcript of Mr. Voldstad's opening remarks was edited to remove minor 
cadences of speech that appear awkward in writing and to provide sources and 
references to other explanatory materials where the editors deemed appropriate. 
* Mr. Voldstad was Chief Executive Officer and Executive Director of International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. from November 30, 2009 until December 31, 
2011.  Prior to his time at ISDA, Mr. Voldstad managed his own debt and currency 
hedge fund until 2007.  Before that, he occupied several senior roles at Merrill Lynch, 
including Co-Head of Global Debt Markets, as well as at J.P. Morgan, where he served 
as the first head of their Global Swaps Group until 1987.  Mr. Voldstad holds a J.D. 
from Fordham University, an M.B.A from the Amos Tuck School of Business at 
Dartmouth College, and a B.A. from Boston College. 
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discussing the role of OTC derivatives in the financial crisis.  Then I’ll 
comment on counterparty losses sustained by the U.S. banking system 
on OTC derivatives.  Some of what I say may surprise you.  In my next 
topic, I will discuss the present marketplace, and how much has been 
accomplished to make the markets safer and more efficient—to use 
ISDA’s new tag line.  I think some of this will also surprise you.  Then I 
will look at overkill—how proposed regulations create enormous costs 
with very little benefit.  I will offer alternatives as well.  But please 
remember these opinions are my own. 
I. OTC DERIVATIVES IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Shortly after my arrival at ISDA, I published an Op-Ed in the 
Financial Times.  In that piece, I argued that the main cause of the 
financial crisis was the US residential and commercial mortgage 
markets, and bad lending and underwriting decisions and practices.1  I 
did not go into why this happened.  We have all read explanations, and I 
believe blame was widespread: regulators and policymakers made 
terrible mistakes; Government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) had 
conflicted business models; mortgage bankers were unscrupulous in 
originating mortgages; rating agencies developed horrid rating  
practices; securities dealers structured complex mortgage products 
around the rating agency criteria and then actually decided they could 
hold them on their balance sheets once AIG Financial Products (“AIG 
FP”) closed for business.  An entire insurance industry class disappeared 
as they insured these toxic securities, some at the beckoning of dealers 
who realized that their holdings were plummeting in value, and some at 
the request of investors who wished to bet against mortgages.  I then 
listed many of the dozens of companies that had ceased to exist due to 
one underlying cause: tremendous losses on real estate exposure.2  Some 
of the exposure was taken in derivative form but a good deal of this was 
meant to insure dealers that already had taken the risk. 
In September 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.3  Panic 
unfolded when money market funds broke the buck.4  These funds had 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Conrad Voldstad, Op-Ed., We Have Yet to Address the Cause of the Financial 
Crises, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jul. 6, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 
88b39646-890e-11df-8925-00144feab49a.html#axzz2AMckCygD. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Brothers Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is 
Sold, NY TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/ 
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invested in cash securities issued by Lehman Brothers.  At least we have 
not heard pundits say that derivatives caused the money fund problems.  
Lehman’s derivatives portfolio was duly unwound.  Much interdealer 
exposure was unwound at SwapClear, where $8 trillion was moved at a 
cost of around $200 million, all covered by initial margin.  Dealers and 
other counterparties unwound positions in due course and submitted 
claims in bankruptcy. 
Interestingly, we examined the derivatives related claims on 
Lehman’s estate by non-financial corporations and found only five 
instances where claims exceeded $25 million.  (We excluded a $300 
million claim by the New York Giants, which had issued auction-market 
securities that unraveled earlier in 2008 because of the deterioration of 
its insurance company guarantor.)  Our analysis showed the losses from 
derivatives hardly put the system at risk. They were not helpful, of 
course, but they were manageable. 
Furthermore, the credit default swap (“CDS”) market for Lehman 
as a reference entity functioned properly.  There was, to be sure, some 
anxiety in the market until the net CDS exposure on Lehman was 
disclosed.  It was only about $5.5 billion.  Offsetting trades were 
matched and the high collateralization of CDS meant that no 
counterparty failed to meet its obligations. 
Very shortly after Lehman, the New York Fed bailed out AIG.  
AIG FP had guaranteed, in CDS form, approximately $60 billion of 
subprime collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) through the end of 
2005.  Unlike most financial firms, AIG FP generally did not have to 
post variation margin on its derivatives unless it was downgraded below 
AA.  When the downgrade occurred, AIG had a monstrous margin call.  
But the margin calls were not confined to CDS.  AIG also held a $50 
billion plus portfolio of subprime mortgages for its bond lending 
business.  Borrowers of these securities would not post 100% cash 
collateral when the securities were worth fractions of that amount.  
Instead, AIG had to come up with the difference.  That is why there 
were two special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) set up by the New York 
Fed.  Maiden Lane II contained the subprime mortgages from the bond 
                                                                                                                                         
15lehman.html. 
 4. Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Fund Falls Below $1 a Share, 
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aycQDd9pEdCA&refer=home. 
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lending operation, 5  while Maiden Lane III eventually purchased the 
underlying bonds covered by the CDS.6  There were no losses sustained 
by AIG FP’s counterparties as a result of the New York Fed’s actions. 
Interestingly, sources at AIG indicated that, as of last fall, no cash losses 
would have been sustained to date on the CDS had they remained in 
place. 
As I mentioned earlier, I spent a few years on the Board of a credit 
reinsurer during the period that spanned the financial crisis.  This gave 
me a great perspective on what happened in the mortgage market.  With 
AIG FP out of business, the primary credit insurers, called monolines, 
rushed to take AIG FP’s place.  Some of this credit protection was 
structured for investors betting against mortgages.  Far more was 
structured to make the underlying bonds easier to sell or to protect 
positions held by dealers. 
I can only say I was shocked by what I saw.  The entire industry 
has been virtually wiped out and dealer losses on exposures to 
monolines were staggering.  ISDA did a paper last year and found 
provisions for losses among a dozen dealers were in excess of $50 
billion with respect to monoline risk.7  A good deal of these provisions 
was taken by foreign firms or US non-bank entities.  The US banking 
system was not badly hurt at all.  The losses attributed to the monolines’ 
derivatives exposure were the largest single negative of OTC derivatives 
in the financial crisis.  These exposures were not collateralized, similar 
to the practice relating to AIG FP.  I thought you would all be pleased to 
learn that derivatives with monolines have been excluded from Dodd-
Frank.  So much for getting the legislation right. 
II. OCC REPORTS 
Each quarter, the Office of the Controller of the Currency (“OCC”) 
produces a report on the derivatives activity of US banks.  We have 
found the report to be very helpful.  It outlines gross and net credit 
                                                                                                                                         
 5. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Counterparty Credit Risk Management in the US Over-the-Counter (OTC) 
Derivatives Markets, Part II: A Review of Monoline Exposures, ISDA, 1 (Nov. 8, 
2011), http://www2.isda.org/attachment/MzcyMQ==/Counterparty%20Credit% 20Risk 
%20II%20(Monolines).pdf. 
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exposure and the use of collateral.  It also contains useful data with 
respect to US bank participation in the market. 
From the beginning of 2007 through the third quarter of 2011, 
charge-offs related to OTC derivatives amounted to $4.345 billion.  This 
includes $1.6 billion last year on a single monoline by one bank.  It also 
includes nearly $850 million in the fourth quarter of 2008, which was 
presumably related to Lehman.  Excluding those two amounts, charge-
offs totaled only $1.9 billion, hardly a significant amount.  The OCC 
report each quarter explains that the credit quality of participants in the 
OTC derivatives market is superior to Commercial and Industrial 
(“C&I”) borrowers.  Credit risk is also mitigated by netting of exposures 
and significant use of collateral.  I need to repeat my comment with 
respect to monoline exposure, however.  Very little of this was booked 
in commercial banks. 
III. WHAT IS NEEDED? 
If one reflects on what happened, it is not difficult to summarize 
what went wrong, and what is needed.  First, bank supervisors did not 
know the risks that regulated banks were taking on.  Neither they nor the 
banks appreciated the risks of their real estate and mortgage portfolios.  
Nor did they have ready information on the derivatives risk of their 
regulated banks.  Granted, they had the ability to inspect the banks and 
many regulators had staff permanently residing at the banks.  But they 
did not feel they knew what market risks were present and what entities 
were accumulating risk. 
Second, the industry allowed large amounts of risk to go un-
collateralized.  I am speaking now of AIG FP and the monolines as 
examples. (But I know of no other examples.)  Whether this would have 
prevented the losses from occurring is unknown.  The insurance 
companies would not have dreamed the value of their policies could 
require the collateral that would be needed.  If the CDS would not have 
been written had collateral been required, much of the risk would have 
remained in cash form on dealers’ books. 
Finally, regulators had to be sure there could be an orderly 
liquidation of positions in the bankruptcy of a major participant. 
IV. WHAT HAS HAPPENED? 
In my opinion, there has been tremendous progress even in the 
absence of final regulations.  Much of this progress was initiated back in 
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2005 when the New York Fed assembled a group of global regulators 
and the largest dealers to set commitments on improving the safety and 
infrastructure of the market.8  Derivative confirmations are now largely 
transmitted electronically.  CDS terms have been standardized, enabling 
trades to be torn up.  A credit event determination and auction process 
has been established and is working very well. 
Clearing has risen dramatically among the top thirty-five or so 
dealers.  Today, over $300 trillion of Interest Rate Swaps (“IRSs”) are 
being cleared.  Clearing is also catching on in the CDS marketplace. 
There, over 75% of the market has been torn up in compression runs 
(some $82 trillion to date) or has been cleared.  Compression in the IRS 
market has totaled a staggering $164 trillion through year-end 2011.9 
Dealers are getting much better at compression of both IRS and CDS 
products and more progress is coming.10 
Through ISDA, trade repositories are in place for credit and rates 
products, and commodities and equity derivatives are in the works. 
ISDA has also proposed building a counterparty credit repository that 
will contain the value of each counterparty’s derivatives as well as the 
collateral that supports it. 
There has been much talk about the riskiness of the CDS market, 
and I thought it would be useful to go through the metrics and risk 
practices of the product.  First, market data has been available through 
the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”) and its 
website.11  As of year-end 2011, DTCC reported some $25.9 trillion of 
notional outstanding CDS,12 with non-dealers making up $4.5 trillion. 
Actual open positions total only $2.7 trillion.13  The other important 
point to understand with respect to CDS is the very high level of 
collateralization.  ISDA’s last margin survey indicated large dealers 
                                                                                                                                         
 8. See OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW 
YORK, http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html. 
 9. Interest Rate Swap Compression: A Progress Report, ISDA, 1 (Feb. 2012), 
http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/studies/. 
 10. See id. at 9 (discussing the progress dealers have made in IRS compression and 
CDS progress). 
 11. THE DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORPORATION (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.dtcc.com/. 
 12. See OTC Derivatives Market Analysis: Year-end 2011, ISDA.ORG, 7 (June 
2012), https://www2.isda.org/attachment/NDQzNQ==/Market%20Analysis% 
20060612.pdf. 
 13. Id. 
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required over 95% of their counterparties to post collateral. Clearing 
results from the BIS show $5.5 trillion of cleared CDS but this does not 
include the compression I noted a few moments ago of $82 trillion.  The 
most recent figures for net open positions on Greece showed total 
exposures of just over $3 billion.  
V. OVERKILL? 
As I get into my final topic, I’ll remind the audience once again that 
I am speaking as a private citizen.  I’ll also remind the audience I 
believe in what I say. 
First, let’s look at clearing.  It looks like a panacea, but is it? 
Clearing breaks down netting sets and displaces exposures.  Now, a 
client dealer relationship will net IRS against CDS, equity derivatives, 
and commodity derivatives.  It is possible to net an entire derivative 
relationship.  What might happen with clearing? In individual asset 
classes, some positions will be cleared and subject to margin 
requirements.  In the same asset class, other positions will be executed 
bilaterally and will require margin as well.  Many products that can be 
cleared are actually executed because they are hedges for products not 
eligible for clearing such as swaptions.  In this way, clearing may double 
up the need for collateral.  This problem is multiplied because there will 
be separate clearing houses for each product.  Furthermore, the number 
of clearinghouses per asset class is forecast to be large, as many 
countries will require transactions in their markets to be cleared in a 
local clearinghouse. 
Cleared and non-cleared trades will also be subject to initial margin 
requirements.14  This is a troubling requirement as estimates of initial 
margin run in the trillions.  If we assume the cost of the margin is 1%, 
this amounts to $10 billion per trillion per year.  Does anyone believe 
that this is the right price to pay for this protection?  We are not talking 
about variation margin.  How much could have possibly been saved with 
initial margin?  I think the amount is probably in the tens of millions 
globally per annum.  Can not a clearinghouse or other entity provide the 
same protection more efficiently?  I suggested several months ago that 
variation margin is the critical collateral required for safety.  Suppose 
each dealer were to use an entity licensed by regulators to collect 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. See Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major 
Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23732 (proposed Apr. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 23). 
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variation margin collateral across all derivative products on a netted 
basis.  We would retain the benefits of netting and capture the main 
benefits of clearing.  The same licensed entity could organize the 
liquidation of dealer portfolios in a dealer bankruptcy, perhaps by 
collecting some margin from the dealer.  Surely, the savings to the 
system would amount to hundreds of billions, if not trillions, of dollars 
of margin. 
I have not mentioned the systemic risk that might arise out of 
clearinghouses and I cannot blame regulators entirely for forcing an old-
fashioned remedy on the derivatives market.  It is up to the industry to 
design a better mousetrap.  It will be up to regulators to analyze the 
mousetrap to ensure it is strong and flexible.  We do not have to 
eliminate losses on derivatives, but rather ensure any losses are modest. 
My second example of overkill is the mandate for executing certain 
transactions on electronic platforms called swap execution facilities. 
This, of course, is not designed to reduce systemic risk in the 
marketplace.  It is a change of structure that demands a cost-benefit 
analysis that can justify the mandate.  Such an analysis has not been 
done by any government agency.  We performed such an analysis at 
ISDA for the IRS market.  We found that participants expected to get 
worse pricing as a result of the mandate, and the infrastructure cost in 
the US alone would be in excess of $200 million per year with much 
larger upfront costs.  We also showed there would be meaningless 
benefits at best to small users.  Policymakers are jamming the futures 
industry infrastructure on entirely different markets.  In my judgment, 
this provision is not needed at all and I welcome any member of the 
audience to justify its existence. 
I will make one other observation about reform: It is needed, but it 
needs to be done carefully and analytically.  We have not seen this.  As I 
said, many parties were to blame for the financial crisis.  Regulation 
enabled banks to set aside no capital for many sovereigns and to lever 
$1 of common equity over 700 times through investments in CDOs.  
They need to listen as well as prescribe regulations. 
I would like to end my remarks with a story.  It is a story about 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  It seems the famed jurist was getting 
on in years, and one day was taking a train trip.  The conductor 
approached him to ask for his ticket and Holmes fumbled around 
looking for it.  The conductor recognized Holmes and smiled at him 
saying, “Don’t worry Justice Holmes.  You can mail the ticket in when 
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you find it.”  To which Holmes replied, “The problem isn’t where is my 
ticket?  The problem is where am I going?” 
I think in the rush to enact—and to implement—regulatory reform, 
we can forget exactly what it is we are trying to do.  We focus instead 
on the politically expedient, or the little, and not the big picture.  That, 
of course, is a big mistake and we need to work hard to prevent it. 
This concludes my remarks. I hope I have given the panelists food 
for thought.  
